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OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW
such abuse by a prosecutor to go unremedied and encourages misrepresenta-
tion by the prosecutor as to his intent at the time of such conduct. The benefit
of uniformity could well have been accomplished by a more clear definition
of the overreaching standard as set forth in the previous cases, and such a
decision would have entailed less cost to the protection afforded by the dou-
ble jeopardy clause.
Steven Paul Shreder
Discrimination: The Remedial Scope of Title IX of the
Education Amendments of 1972, As Interpreted in Grove
City College and Richmond University
Section 901 of Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972' provides
that: "No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded
from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimina-
tion under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance .... "" This legislation is intended to discourage sex-based discrimina-
tion under any educational program or activity receiving federal financial
assistance. This apparently clear mandate, however, has provoked extensive
controversy and judicial discord. At the center of the dispute is the question
of program specificity and direct versus indirect aid. Is Title IX "program-
specific" and therefore only enforceable against particular programs receiv-
ing federal aid? How shall a "program" for Title IX purposes be defined?3
Must the federal financial assistance go directly to a particular program to
bring it within the purview of Title IX?
This note will discuss these questions in view of two of the most recent
federal cases in this area. Grove City College v. Bell' and University of
Richmond v. Bell.5 The legislative history of Title IX and prior case law will
also be considered.
Facts in Grove City College
Grove City College is a private coeducational college affiliated with the
United Presbyterian Church. It is located in Grove City, Pennsylvania. Some
2,200 students attend Grove City College, of which 140 are eligible to receive
Basic Educational Opportunity Grants (BEOGs). BEOGs are appropriated by
1. Pub. L. No. 92-318, tit. IX, 86 Stat. 373, codified in 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-86 (1972) and
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. § 29 (1972).
2. 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1972).
3. See Note, Title VI, Title IX, and the Private University: Defining "Recipient" and
"Program or Part Thereof," 78 MICH. L. Ray. 608 (1980).
4. 687 F.2d 684 (3d Cir. 1982).
5. 543 F. Supp. 321 (E.D. Va. 1982).
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Congress and allocated by the Department of Education. Grove City College
receives no other federal or state financial assistance?
In July 1976 the Department of Education began efforts to secure an
assurance of compliance from Grove City College, based on its students' receipt
of BEOGs." Grove City College refused, contending that the receipt of BEOGs
did not constitute "federal financial assistance" within the meaning of Title
IX. The College's position was that BEOGs paid to students did not establish
direct federal financial assistance to Grove City College and that, therefore,
it was not subject to Title IX regulation. At this point, the Department of
Education brought administrative proceedings to terminate federal grants
(BEOGs) to the College's students.
After an administrative hearing, an administrative law judge concluded that
Grove City College was a recipient of "federal financial assistance"8 within
the meaning of Title IX and that the allocation of BEOGs could be terminated
for the school's refusal to execute an assurance of compliance. Grove's
administration admitted that the school had not filed the assurance, and the
administrative law judge. entered an order terminating BEOG funds.
On November 29, 1980, Grove City College, joined by four students, brought
suit against the Department of Education. In an amended opinion, on June
26, 1980, the district court granted Grove's motion for summary judgment
and denied the cross-motion of the Department. The Department's appeal
followed. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed,
holding that Grove was a recipient of federal financial assistance within the
meaning of Title IX.
Grove City College asserted that BEOGs should not be included within the
scope of federal financial assistance because the phrase refers only to direct
aid to particular programs, not to educational grants paid to students. Grove
argued that federal financial assistance in the form of BEOGs is incompatible
with the requirement that enforcement of Title IX be "program-specific."
In Grove's view, Title IX's reference to "program" or "activity" indicates
that the Act's provisions cannot apply on a generalized, nonprogrammatic,
or institutional basis. Grove reasoned that because the BEOGs its students
receive cannot be tied to particular programs, the College cannot, under the
6. Initially, the Department of Education also cited Grove's students' receipt of Guaranteed
Student Loans as "federal financial assistance." The district court found that GSLs were "con-
tracts of guarantee" within the exception to § 902. On appeal, the Department does not contest
the district court's conclusion.
7. The Department of Education is the primary administrator of federal financial assistance
to education. The Department requires that each recipient file an assurance of compliance as
a means of assuring adherence to Title IX. 34 C.F.R. § 106.4(a).
8. The Department has construed the phrase "federal financial assistance" to include educa-
tional grants paid to students, and thus, recieved indirectly by the schools which they attend.
The Department defines federal financial assistance in part as: "(1) A grant or loan of Federal
financial assistance, including funds made available for: ...
"(ii) Scholarships, loans, grants, wages or other funds extended to any entity, or extended
directly to such students for payment to that entity." 34 C.F.R. § 106.2(g)(1), (ii).
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program-specificity requirement, be a "recipient" within the meaning of Title
IX and is exempt from Title IX regulation.'
The court disagreed, finding that "[c]omplete accommodation can be
achieved between the concepts of 'indirect federal financial assistance' and
'program-specific' requirements."'" The court's decision rests on a broad
interpretation of Title IX that gives full scope to its "non-discriminatory
purpose.""
Facts in University of Richmond
The University of Richmond is a private university consisting of several
separate schools and colleges, including two coordinate undergraduate liberal
arts colleges: Richmond College for men and Westhampton College for women.
Students from both colleges attend classes together; however, the two colleges
maintain separate graduation exercises and provide many separate auxiliary
services. The Athletic Department at the University of Richmond provides
intercollegiate and club sports for both men and women. It is funded separately
from other programs at the University, and its budget is drawn from sports
revenues, gifts, and general funds of the University. The Athletic Department
receives no direct federal financial assistance.
In a letter dated February 6, 1981, the Department of Education notified
the University of Richmond that the Office of Civil Rights (OCR) had received
a sex discrimination complaint in the University's athletic program. OCR's
authority to investigate the University of Richmond's athletic program was
based upon the University's receipt of National Direct Student Loans, Basic
Educational Opportunity Grants (BEOGs), Supplemental Educational Oppor-
tunity Grants, College Work Study, and Department of Education Grants.
The Department requested certain information in reference to the Universi-
ty's athletic program.
In another letter dated March 31, 1981, the Department stated OCR's
authority to investigate the University's athletic program under Title IX:
Whether a particular education program or activity directly receives
Federal funds is not determinative of the coverage of that program
or activity by Title IX. Rather, the determination is based on
whether the "recipient" institution receives, either directly or
indirectly "Federal financial assistance" which benefits its programs
and activities. See Bob Jones University v. Johnson, 396 F. Supp.
9. Grove relies on several prior cases: University of Richmond v. Bell, 543 F. Supp. 321
(E.D. Va. 1982); Othen v. Ann Arbor School Bd., 507 F. Supp. 1376 (E.D. Mich. 1981); Bennett
v. West Texas State Univ., 525 F. Supp. 77 (N.D. Tex. 1981). Othen and Bennett relied heavily
on employment regulation cases, which are questionable in light of a recent Supreme Court deci-
sion, North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512 (1982). A discussion of discrimination
in employment under Title IX is beyond the scope of this note.
10. Grove City College v. Bell, 687 F.2d 684, 697 (3d Cir. 1982).
11. Id.
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597 (D.S.C. 1974), aff'd per curiam, 529 F.2d 514 (4th Cir. 1975);
Grove City College v. Harris, 500 F. Supp. 253 (W.D. Pa. 1980).12
The Department contended that although most of the financial assistance
was paid directly to the students and not to the University itself, the receipt
of federal funds is conditional upon the student's enrollment in an approved
institution of higher education. In this sense, the institution is the ultimate
beneficiary of the funds that enable students to attend the institution and
to pay tuition and other educational expenses. The University of Richmond
also received direct grants under the College Library Resources Program'3
in the amount of $1,900 (1980-81) and $1,200 (1981-82). By virtue of the direct
grants extended to the University and the receipt of federal funds by its
students, the University must comply with the antidiscrimination provisions
of Title IX in all of its educational programs and activities, including athletics.
The Department cautioned that if Richmond failed to comply with the
investigation, the Department would bring enforcement proceedings.
The University of Richmond informed OCR of its refusal to comply with
the investigation and supply the data requested, and filed an action seeking
injunctive and declaratory relief. The United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Virginia granted the University of Richmond summary
judgment and enjoined the Department of Education from commencing
enforcement proceedings against the University. The Department was also
enjoined from investigating "any program or activity at an educational
institution located within the jurisdiction of this Court absent a showing that
the program or activity is the recipient of direct federal financial assistance.""'
The decisions in Grove City College and University of Richmond are
diametrically opposed. The broad interpretation given Title IX's provisions
in Grove City College cannot be reconciled with the narrow "program-specific"
requirement articulated in University of Richmond. To assess the wisdom of
these conflicting opinions, the legislative history of Title IX, as well as prior
case law, must be examined.
Legislative History of Title IX
Prior to Title IX, students attempting to contest interscholastic discrimina-
tion relied on the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.'I The
early case of Brenden v. Independent School District 74216 illustrates the equal
protection approach. Two high school girls brought an action under the equal
protection clause challenging a regulation enjoining females from participating
with males in interscholastic athletics. The court held that the regulation was
12. University of Richmond v. Bell, 543 F. Supp. 321, 323-24 n.5 (E.D. Va. 1982).
13. 20 U.S.C. § 1029 (1972).
14. University of Richmond v. Bell, 543 F. Supp. 321, 333 (1982).
15. Martin, Title IX and Intercollegiate Athletics: Scoring Points for Women, 8 Omo N.U.L.
REv. 481, 484 (1981).
16. 477 F.2d 1292 (8th Cir. 1973).
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arbitrary and unreasonable and violative of equal protection. There were several
other pre-Title IX cases that relied on an equal protection theory.7 However,
on close examination, the constitutional cause of action proves unsatisfac-
tory. First, a successful claim based on constitutional protection would have
to meet certain standards. The existence of state action or federal involve-
ment could create a jurisdictional problem.
The proper standard of review might also limit the success of an equal pro-
tection claim. Courts generally have not applied strict scrutiny, the most
exacting standard, to gender-based classifications. This is because gender-based
classifications are not considered suspect, as are classifications such as those
based on race or national origin.'8 Finally, one commentator notes: "Courts
have generally not scrutinized teams closely to determine if girls' and boys'
teams are actually equivalent. Thus, separate-and-unequal opportunities may
satisfy the constitutional standard."'9
Congress apparently was not satisfied that the equal protection clause
provided a firm enough foothold to discourage sex-based discrimination and,
in 1972, enacted Title IX to eradicate gender-based discrimination in
education.20 Title IX was based on Title VI, the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
which proscribes discrimination by reason of race, color, religion, or national
origin, and the drafters of Title IX assumed that it would be interpreted and
applied as Title VI had been during the preceding eight years.' Title VI
provides: "No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color
or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits
of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving
Federal financial assistance."22 The provision in Title VI authorizing
administrative enforcement of Title VI through termination or refusal of federal
aid is identical to administrative enforcement provisions found in Title IX.11
During floor debates on the 1964 Civil Rights Act, Senator Hubert
Humphrey stressed: "[s]imple justice requires that public funds, to which all
taxpayers of all races contribute, not be spent in any fashion which encourages,
entrenches, subsidizes or results in racial discrimination."2 In Cannon v.
University of Chicago, the Supreme Court stated that Title IX, like Title VI,
was designed "to avoid the use of federal resources to support discriminatory
practices.""
17. See Bucha v. Illinois High School Ass'n, 351 F. Supp. 69 (N.D. Ill. 1972); Reed v. Nebraska
School Activities Ass'n, 341 F. Supp. 258 (D. Neb. 1972).
18. Martin, supra note 15, at 484-85.
19. Cox, Intercollegiate Athletics and Title IX, 46 GEo. WAH. L. REv. 34, 58-59 (1977).
20. 20 U.S.C. § 1631 (1972).
21. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 696 (1979). (Cannon is primarily recognized
for its holding that a private cause of action exists under Title IX.)
22. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1977).
23. Compare 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (1972) (Title IX) with 42 U.S.C. § 2000d(l) (1977) (Title VI).
24. 110 CONG. REc. 6543 (1964) (Sen. Humphrey quoting President Kennedy's message to
Congress, June 19, 1963), quoted in Grove City College v. Bell, 687 F.2d 684, 691 n.13 (3d
Cir. 1982) (emphasis added).
25. 441 U.S. 677, 704 (1978).
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Although Title IX was modeled after Title VI, there are some differences
between them. Legislatures and courts, along with the general populace of
American society, perceive sex discrimination as less onerous or less invidious
than discrimination based on race, color, or national origin. 6 Consequently,
unlike Title VI, Title IX contains exemptions and deferments reflecting
significant popular as well as judicial indecision.27 The hesitancy of some courts
to give Title IX its full remedial impact reflects this indecision.
Direct Versus Indirect Aid
In 1971, Senator Birch Bayh introduced a forerunner to Title IX as an
amendment o the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965.28 Senator
Bayh stated:
The bill deals with equal access to education. Such access should
not be denied because of poverty or sex. If we are going to give
all students an equal education, women must finally be guaranteed
equal access to education ....
[I]t does not do any good to pass out hundreds of millions of
dollars if we do not see that the money is applied equitably to
over half of our citizens.2 9
Debates over Senator Bayh's proposal indicate that funds coming under
the amendment were intended to include virtually every type of federal
assistance, direct or indirect, including BEOGs administered to students (as
is the case in Grove City College). Supporting Senator Bayh's position, Senator
George McGovern stated: "I urge the passage of Senator Bayh's amendment
to assure that no funds. . . [b]e extended to any institutidn that practices
biased admissions or educational policies."130 Similarly, when Senator Bayh
was asked what type of aid might be subject to cancellation of funds under
Title IX, he replied, "We are cutting off all aid that comes through the Dept.
of Health, Education and Welfare." 3'
26. See Brown, Emerson, Falk & Freedman, The Equal Rights Amendment: A Constitu-
tional Basis for Equal Rights For Women, 80 YALE L.J. 871 (1971). For a general discussion
of sex discrimination focusing on the historically different legal treatment of sex and race discrimina-
tion, see Johnson & Knapp, Sex Discrimination by Law: A Study in Judicial Perspective. 46
N.Y.U.L. Ray. 675, 738 (1971).
27. See Buek & Orleans, Sex Discrimination-A Bar to Democratic Education: Overview
of Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 6 CONN. L. REv. 1, 3 (1973).
28. See 117 CONG. REc. 30,155-57 (1971), where Senator Bayh proposed Title IX as an amend-
ment to the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, 20 U.S.C. §§ 236-244 (1970).
29. 117 CoNG. REc. 30,412 (1971), quoted in Grove City College v. Bell, 687 F.2d 684, 692
(3d Cir. 1982).
30. 117 CoNG. REc. 30,158-59 (1971) (emphasis added).
31. 117 CONG. REc. 30,408 (1971), quoted in Grove City College v. Bell, 687 F.2d 684, 692
(3d Cir. 1982). "The Department of Health, Education and Welfare" being referred to here.
The Department of Education has replaced HEW as administrator of Title IX by authority of





The 1971 amendment was not adopted, but a substantially similar
amendment was submitted and adopted on February 28, 1972.32 Senator Bayh
stated that the second version provided a "comprehensive approach which
incorporated... the key provisions of my earlier amendment. . .. ,"33 This
second version is Title IX as it is known today.
Legislative history supports the contention that Congress intended Title IX,
as was its forerunner Title VI, to be broadly construed. The court in Grove
City College stated:
While it is true that the legislative history makes no explicit reference
to "indirect" financial assistance such as student grants, the 1971
debates make it clear that Congress' overriding objective in enacting
Title IX, that is, to withhold public funds from an educational
institution which engages in sex discrimination, was to deny to
discriminating institutions all such financial support, direct or other-
wise. Thus, as we construe the legislative history it is consistent
with the Education Department's position [in Grove City College],
that Title IX applies to any institution which receives indirect or
direct federal financial assistance.3 '
Post-enactment history of Title IX further indicates that indirect assistance
such as BEOGs come within the scope of federal financial assistance under
Title IX. On June 4, 1975, the Department of Education published its final
Title IX regulations3" and submitted them to Congress for review. The pro-
cess of review gives Congress the opportunity to assess an agency's regula-
tions fully to determine whether the regulations are consistent in purpose with
the act from which the agency derives its authority. If Congress finds the
regulations inconsistent with the act in question, Congress can disapprove the
regulations by a concurrent resolution. If no such resolution is passed within
forty-five days of the submission to Congress, the regulations become
effective.36 During congressional review of Title IX regulations, indirect aid
was specifically brought to the attention of members of Congress. Then HEW
Secretary Weinberger told congressmen that the Department construed "federal
financial assistance" to include indirect assistance programs. He stated:
Our view was that student assistance, assistance that the Govern-
ment furnishes, that goes directly or indirectly to an institution
is Government aid within the meaning of Title IX. If it is not,
there is an easy remedy. Simply tell us it is not. We believe it is
and base our assumption on that.3 '
32. 118 CONG. REc. 5808 (1972).
33. Id., quoted in Grove City College v. Bell, 687 F.2d 684, 692 (3d Cir. 1982).
34. Grove City College v. Bell, 687 F.2d 684, 692-93 (3d Cir. 1982) (emphasis added).
35. 40 Fed. Reg. 24,128 (1975).
36. 20 U.S.C. § 1232(d)(1) (1977).
37. Sex Discrimination Regulations: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Postsecondary Educa-
tion of the House Comm. on Education & Labor, 94th Cong., Ist Sess. 481-84 (1975), quoted
in Grove City College v. Bell, 687 F.2d 684, 693 (3d Cir. 1982) (emphasis added).
[Vol. 36
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1983
NOTES
Several concurrent resolutions were proposed, including a resolution by
Senator Jesse Helms that would have disapproved Title IX regulations because
they did not limit application of Title IX to programs and activities directly
receiving federal financial assistance.3 Other proposed regulations disapproved
of the regulations entirely. 9 Neither house passed a "disapproval" resolution.
Impliedly, then, Congress considered the regulations within the scope of the
statute.
A leading case supporting the indirect aid analysis of the Department of
Education is Bob Jones University v. Johnson," a Title VI case." In Bob
Jones University, the Department denied eligible veterans enrolled at the
University veterans' benefits because the University engaged in racially
discriminatory practices. The University, like Grove City College, argued that
because the individual students received the aid in the form of veterans'
benefits, Bob Jones University was not a "recipient" of "federal financial
assistance" within the meaning of Title VI and hence was not subject to Title
VI regulation.
The court in Bob Jones University rejected this argument. It found that
the University was a recipient of federal financial assistance because it benefited
by the veterans' payments. The court stated: "payments to veterans . . .
[release] institutional funds which would, in the absence of federal assistance,
be spent on the student."'2 The court also stated that "the participation of
veterans who-but for the availability of federal funds-would not enter the
educational programs . . . [enlarges] the pool of qualified applicants upon
which the school can draw for its educational program."'3 Finally, the court
concluded: "[W]hether the cash payments are made to a university and
thereafter distributed to eligible veterans rather than the present mode of
transmittal is irrelevant, since the payments ultimately reach the same
beneficiaries and the benefit to a university would be the same in either
event."" The court went on to distinguish between a situation such as Bob
Jones University in which cash payments made by the government to an
individual are "expressly conditioned upon this pursuit of an approved course
of study at an approved educational institution,' '1 5 and a situation in which
cash payments to an individual "may be utilized without restriction, and which
are not dependent upon an individual beneficiary's partipation in any program
or activity. '" 6 In the former situation, payments are specifically tied to the
38. S. Con. Res. 46, 94th Cong., Ist Sess., reprinted in 121 CONG. Rc. 13,300 (1975).
39. H.R. Con. Res. 310, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 121 CoNG. REc. 19,209 (1975);
H. Con. Res. 329, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 121 CONG. Msc. 21,687 (1975); H.R. Con.
Res. 330, 94th Cong., Ist Sess. reprinted in 121 CONG. REc. 21,687 (1975).
40. 396 F. Supp. 597 (D.S.C. 1974), aff'd mem., 529 F.2d .514 (4th Cir. 1975).
41. Congress intended Title IX to be construed as Title VI, its legislative forerunner. See
text accompanying notes 21-25 supra.
42. 396 F. Supp. 597, 602 (D.S.C. 1974), aff'd mem., 529 F.2d 514 (4th Cir. 1975).
43. Id. at 603.
44. Id. at 603, 604.





beneficiary's Participation in an educational program or activity, bringing these
payments within the scope of federal financial assistance under Title VI.
The court of appeals in Grove City College relied heavily on the Bob Jones
University analysis when it concluded that indirect federal financial assistance
(in the form of BEOGs) brought Grove City College within the purview of
Title IX. The court of appeals, in its agreement with the Department of Educa-
tion, articulates a well-founded decision based on the statutory language of
Title IX, its legislative history, post-enactment events, and the Bob Jones
University decision.
Program Specificity
The other major controversy presented in the two cases is that of program-
specificity. Grove City College and Richmond University both contended that
Title IX would apply only to a particular program receiving direct federal
financial assistance.,' The court in University of Richmond agreed. The court
in Grove City College did not.
The Title IX regulations"" are at the heart of the dispute concerning its
interpretation and application. The regulations are divided into five major
subparts and forty-three sections. The two sections pertinent to Grove City
College and University of Richmond are the definitional section and the section
indentifying the general coverage of the regulation.
The regulations define "federal financial assistance" to include not only
direct funds extended to a university but also loans, grants, scholarships, or
funds extended to students for payment o the institution.9 Thus the BEOGs
paid to students at Grove City College would be within the scope of Title
IX. The regulations define "recipient" as any entity (1) that recieves federal
financial assistance from the government or another recipient, and (2) that
"operates an educational program or activity which receives or benefits from
such assistance."5'
The Department of Education contends that all educational programs benefit
if any single program receives federal financial assistance because that assistance
releases institutional funds for use in other programs." This rationale underlies
both the Bob Jones University and Grove City College decisions. The educa-
tional program and activities of both institutions are benefited by the federal
grants allotted to student recipients. Bob Jones University and Grove City
College are entities (1) receiving federal financial assistance from the govern-
47. Grove City College v. Bell, 687 F.2d 684, 690-91 (3d Cir.) (1982); University of Rich-
mond v. Bell, 543 F. Supp. 321, 324-25 (E.D. Va. 1982).
48. 39 Fed. Reg. 22,227 (1974). Under section 902, each agency awarding federal financial
assistance "other than a contract of insurance or guaranty" to any education program or activity
is authorized to promulgate regulations to ensure compliance with section 901(A). 20 U.S.C.
§ 1682 (1972).
49. 45 C.F.R. § 86.2(g) (1975).
50. Id. § 86.2(h) (emphasis added).
51. Comment, HEW's Regulation Under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972:
Ultra Vires Challenges, 1976 B.Y.U.L. R-v. 133, 150 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Comment].
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tivity which receives or benefits from such assistance." The schools are receiv-
ing assistance from another "recipient," the students, and are benefiting from
it. The word "benefit" is crucial because it demonstrates that the regulations
have expanded the statutory language of Title IX to include a "benefit" theory.
Not only is "any educational program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance' 53 covered, but any educational program or activity that benefits
from federal financial assistance is subject to Title IX regulation. As the court
in Bob Jones University stated:
Payments to veterans enrolled at approved schools serve to defray
the costs of the educational program of the schools thereby releasing
institutional funds which would, in the absence of federal assistance,
be spent on the student .... [B]ob Jones' participation in the...
[N]ational Defense Student Loan program (NDSL) relieved the
university from the burden of committing its assets to loans to
eligible students."
Legal commentators also advocate a broad interpretation of Title IX. One
commentator suggests that "federal financial assistance" connotes a benefit
conferred rather than a specific amount of money given to a particular
program. This commentator points out that Congress' power to regulate its
spending is plenary, and it is well within the authority of Congress to place
reasonable restrictions upon a school's use of federal financial assistance. This
includes indirect benefits derived from federal funding upon a particular
school's athletic department, even though that particular program may not
be receiving funds directly."
Another commentator says that although federal funds may not go directly
to a football program, for instance, federal aid to any of the school's other
programs frees money for use in athletics." The commentator goes on to
suggest that "without federal aid a school would have to reduce program
offerings or use its resources more efficiently. The Act [Title IX] speaks of
federal financial assistance. If federal aid benefits a discriminatory program
by freeing funds for the program, the aid assists it. ' 5 '
The court in University of Richmond, based upon its support of strict
construction of the program-specific provision of Title IX, sees the Title IX
regulations as an ultra vires act by HEW and the Department of Education.8
The court contends that the benefit theory articulated in the Title IX regula-
52. See 45 C.F.R. § 86.2(h) (1975).
53. 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1972).
54. 396 F. Supp. 597, 603 (D.S.C. 1974), aff'd mem., 529 F.2d 514 (4th Cir. 1975).
55. Note, itle IX and Intercollegiate Athletics: HEW Gets Serious About Equality in Sports,
15 NEw ENG. L. REv. 573, 589-90 (1980).
56. Note, Title IX of the 1972 Education Amendments: Preventing Sex Discrimination In
Public Schools, 53 Tax. L. Rav. 103, 110 (1974).
57. Id. at 110.
58. University of Richmond v. Bell, 543 F. Supp. 321, 325 (E.D. Va. 1982). For further
discussion, see Comment, supra note 51.
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tions extends too far beyond the authorizing statute." This is a weak argument.
In resolving an ultra vires challenge, courts must construe the authorizing
statute to determine if the regulations in question are unauthorized. Yet it
is often the administrative regulation itself that serves as an interpretation
of the underlying statute.6 0 The interpretation of a statute by the agency
charged with its administration is entitled to deference."' Also, as mentioned,
Congress had forty-five days in which to pass a disapproval resolution of
Title IX regulations; neither house passed such a resolution. Congress could
not have been unaware of the heated debate over coverage of indirectly funded
athletic programs.6 " HEW received an unprecedented 9,700 comments on the
proposed Title IX regulations.63 It appears that if Congress had not intended
Title IX to cover indirectly funded athletic programs, the intense media and
congressional scrutiny of the regulations on athletics would have led to a
congressional resolution of disapproval. This did not occur.
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals in Haffer v. Temple University has
held that Title IX applies to any educational program that benefits from federal
funds, even though the benefit may be indirect.64 The court in Haffer states:
"Logic supports a broad reading of Title IX and supports upholding the
validity of the [Title IX] regulations."'"
Another possible theory supporting a broad reading of Title IX, as
articulated in Grove City College, is that an educational program under Title
IX should be defined as the entire institution in question. The Grove court
states:
We conclude that the remedy to be ordered for failure to comply
with Title IX is as extensive as the program benefited by the federal
funds involved. Because the federal grants made to Grove's students
necessarily inure to the benefit of the entire college, the "program"
here must be defined as the entire institution of Grove City College.
Thus, Grove is incorrect in claiming that the program-specific
provisions of the statute preclude Title IX coverage when indirect
aid is involved."
Two Title VI cases, Lau v. Nichols7 and Bossier Parish School Board v.
Lemon," support this theory. In these cases the courts, like the court in Grove,
took the position that the respective school districts provided a unitary
education program. This approach is attractive because it negates the ultra
59. 543 F. Supp. at 325.
60. Comment, supra note 51, at 151.
61. 2A C. SANDS, SUTHERAND'S STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 49.05 (4th ed. 1973).
62. Haffer v. Temple Univ. 524 F. Supp. 531, 536 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
63. Cox, Intercollegiate Athletics and Title IX, 46 GEo. WAsH. L. REv. 34, 40 (1977), quoted
in Haffer v. Temple Univ., 524 F. Supp. 531, 536 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
64. Haffer v. Temple Univ., 524 F. Supp. 531, 539 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
65. Id. at 541.
66. Grove City College v. Bell, 687 F.2d 684, 700-01 (3d Cir. 1982).
67. 414 U.S. 563 (1974).
68. 370 F.2d 847 (5th Cir. 1967).
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vires issue. If a university were deemed to offer a unitary program, the ultra
vires issue would be resolved; there would be no difference between an
institution and a program and no disparity between the institutional approach
of the Title IX regulations and the programmatic approach that courts, such
as the one in Richmond, argue Title IX mandates.69
An Intermediate Approach
The Fifth Circuit has articulated an "intermediate approach" for resolving
the issues of direct/indirect aid and program specificity in Board of Public
Instruction v. Finch," a Title VI case. In Finch, the court held that all funding
to several programs of a local public school district could not be discontinued
without a showing of discrimination within each particular program (HEW
had instituted a blanket cutoff of aid to the district upon a finding that a
single program was discriminatory). However, the court noted that programs
may be so interrelated that a program guilty of no overt discrimination may
be "infected by a discriminatory environment" and subject to termination
of federal aid."1 This has been labeled the "infection theory."' Tainted
programs are those that are "so affected by discriminatory practices elsewhere
in the school system that it thereby, becomes discriminatory."' "7 One legal
commentator notes of this "infection" theory: "Tainting" is really just the
obverse of "benefiting. ' 7 In either case a program not directly receiving
federal aid can be brought within the ambit of Title IX by a crucial link to
a directly aided program. The commentator goes on to point out that the
use of "tainting" and "benefiting" concepts would fulfill an important element
of the purpose behind Title IX and would also be in accord with the congres-
sional intent that the federal government withhold support, even indirect
support, from discriminatory programs."'
Conclusion
The courts must ultimately decide how broad the power of the Department
of Education will be to terminate federal funds under Title IX. Perhaps the
most striking criticism of the narrow program-specific view articulated in
University of Richmond is its illogical conclusion that the more general the
funding, the more restrictive the coverage. This result defeats the broad
remedial purpose of Title IX. The better approaches are those articulated in
Grove City College and Finch. An expansive reading of Title IX must be
adhered to in order to vindicate its original purpose-to eradicate sex
69. Comment, supra note 51, at 180.
70. 414 F.2d 1068 (5th Cir. 1969).
71. Id. at 1078-79.
72. See Islesboro School Comm. v. Califano, 593 F.2d 424, 430 (Ist Cir. 1979).
73. United States v. Ruthstein, 414 F.2d 1068, 1079 (7th Cir. 1969).
74. Note, Title IX of the 1972 Education Amendments: Preventing Sex Discrimination In
Public Schools, 53 TEx. L. REV. 103, 111 (1974).
75. Id. at 112.
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